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THE PURE THEORY OF LAW
REGINALD PARKER*
Philosophy teaches

us

to

feel

un-

certain about the things that seem to
us self-evident.

Aldous Huxley
There is hardly a theory of law about which there exists so much
confusion in the minds of so many scholars as about Hans Kelsen's
theory, which is commonly known under the name "Pure Theory of
Law." If, for instance, a scholar of the stature and standing of Professor Northrop maintains that Kelsen locates the basic norm of the
Austrian Constitution of 1920 "in the earliest Constitution of 1867,"'
then it seems that there is still room, indeed an intellectual demand,
for a brief and simple exposition of Kelsen's theory. We shall attempt it in the following article 2 not without avoiding the temptation
to oversimplify crucial problems.
The Pure Theory of Law is called "pure" because it is a theory of
law and not, like sociology, of causally related social facts; because it
is a theory of law and not of ethics; and because it is a theory of law
regardless of the political conditions that led to the creation of this
or that democratic, communist, fascist, tribal or other law. It is a
theory of legal positivism, that is, a theory of man-made rather than
transcendental law.
A legal positivist may recognize other normative orders such as
the religious or moral orders, or etiquette; but to him these norms
are not "law," i.e., a part of the legal order, unless they have been
incorporated into law by reference. 3 Moreover, every validly created
legal norm is law to the positivist, even though he may deplore the
state of the law and seek to change it. (The name "legal positivism,"
incidentally, appears to be preferable to "analytical jurisprudence"
* Professor

of Law, Willamette University.

1. NORTHROP, THE COMPLEXITY OF LEGAL AND ETHICAL EXPERIENCE 67 (1959).
Kelsen has of course never said that Austria's basic norm was grounded anywhere save in the successful revolution of 1918.
2. The present article is at the same time a book review of Kelsen's most
recent fruition of his Pure Theory of Law. See KELSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE-

MIT EINEm ANHANG: DAS PROBLEM DER GERECHTIGKEIT (2d ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as KELSEN, REI=E RECHTSLEHRE]. The book is made invaluable also

by the appendix, prepared by Dr. Rudolf Aladar MCtall, of Kelsen's writings
-483 in number!-to the end of 1959. Fortunately for the learned world,
Kelsen has not remained silent since then.
3. E.g., if the law declares immoral contracts to be invalid, if it threatens

aliens guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude with deportation, by
reference to the common welfare of the community, etc.
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and "analytical positivism," which are often used, especially in connection with John Austin's work. The legal thinking of the positivist
is no more "analytical"-either in the sense of critical thinking or
pertaining to analysis as opposed to synthesis-than that of, say, an
adherent of the historical school.)
It is beyond the scope of this brief exposition to outline the history
of legal thinking. Suffice it here to remind ourselves that until the
eighteenth century most, if not all, legal philosophy was steeped in
the theory of natural law. We may add the observation that many
of the great protagonists of one or another natural law idea, such as
Plato, Aristotle (to some extent), Cicero, St. Thomas Aquinas, Richard Hooker, Locke, and Rousseau, were not lawyers but rather general
philosophers or essayists and publicists of one kind or another. However, most lawyers of the past who did indulge in legal philosophy
accepted the natural law doctrine just as much as their brethren of
the purer philosophy. Grotius, Christian Wolff, Samuel Pufendorf,
and, of course, Sir Edward Coke,4 may be mentioned as examples.
The position, however, of some eminent classical lawyers, such as
Ulpian or Bracton, can be regarded. as dubious despite occasional
references to "natural law." 5 The eighteenth century saw the culmination of the natural law idea, with its ideals of "self-evident" rights,
the equality of man and the social contract theory; but it also saw
the rise of skepticism. Montesquieu, the originator of both Western
sociology and comparative jurisprudence, propounded the thesis that
law as well as basic conceptions of justice are necessarily influenced
not only by religion and custom but also by climate and soil. His
contemporary, David Hume, "destroyed the theoretical basis of
natural law" 6 by denying the existence of axiomatic truths and of
ascertainable rational principles in the sphere of human behavior that
would be of universal validity. His ideas, however, failed to replace
the natural law philosophy with a working system of legal theory.
This was first attempted by Friedrich Karl von Savigny, the founder
of the historical school of jurisprudence. His most important disciple
in the world of English law was Sir Henry Maine.

Savigny, one of the greatest legal scholars of all times, pointed out
that, even as language and customs are different in every nation, so
do the legal systems of the nations necessarily vary from one another;
4. In Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Co. 113b, 114a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 647 (1610),
Coke proposed that unreasonable acts of Parliament be void. It cannot be
said, however, that he ever transformed this dictum into a rule of law.
5. Ulpian maintained that natural law is that which "nature teaches all
animals," DIG. 1.1.4., which, if true, would deprive it of its normative
character and constitute it as a mere physical or causal law. BRACTON, DE
LEGmus, bk. I, c. 3, § 1; bk. I, c. 4, § 1, states that law is promulgated by
prudent men in council and that without law a person cannot be just.
6. FRIEDmANN, LEGAL THEORY 50 (3d ed. 1953).
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and that this is indeed desirable, for what is "good" or "correct" law
for one nation is not necessarily so for another.7 Yet Savigny's historical school, which has had a most profund influence on man's
approach to history, forcefully demonstrating that laws are not of
universal validity, retained some natural law element nevertheless.
Savigny insisted that law must be "found" rather than made--"it is
first developed by custom and the people's faith, next by legal science,
therefore everywhere by internal, silently operating forces rather
than the arbitrary will of a legislator." 8 There is some wisdom in this
thesis, in that it states the nature and origin of good and desirable
law, or at any rate of such law as a German law professor of the
romantic school would find (by listening to the "people's spirit") to
be good and desirable; but it fails to explain the nature of law as
such, good, bad, or indifferent. To do this was left to modern positivism.
John Austin pointed out that law cannot be defined by the inclusion
of any ideal of justice. Rather, it must be determined by reference
to its source, i.e., the sovereign: "Every positive law, or every law
simply and strictly so-called, is set by a sovereign person, or a body
of sovereign persons ... ." And the sovereign is defined as a "determinate humane superior, not in a habit of obedience to a like superior,"
9
who receives "habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society."
Thus the command of the sovereign, under threat of sanction, is law
according to Austin. But the question presents itself: Who determines
who the sovereign is? Austin's approach to this obvious problem is
blurred by vague references to the constitution of the state. In other
words, it is a certain set of laws that determines who is to make the
law! This recognition somewhat emasculates Austin's proud sovereign.
Moreover, Austin's theory fails to explain the position of the courts,
wherefore Gray, another pre-Kelsen positivist, could assert that "in
truth" all law is judge-made law, inasmuch as it is the courts that
give legislative enactments their authentic interpretation. 0
Kelsen has resolved these and other doubts. Like Austin, he proposed that whether law is "just" (and therefore, in the view of some,
''natural") or "unjust" depends on criteria not capable of scientific
cognition." Law is enacted for a certain purpose, which the law7. SAVIGNY, VoM BERUF UNSRER ZEIT FUR GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTSWISSENS-

cHArT (2d ed. 1828).
8. SAVIGNY, op. cit. supra note 7, at *14. (Translation is mine.)

9. AusTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JUISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 193-94

(5th ed.,

Campbell, with notes of John Stuart Mill, 1885; re-edited by H. L. A. Hart,
1954). (The citations are to the British "Library of Ideas" edition.)
10. GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 84, 96, 98, 121, 125

(2d ed.

1921). But see KELSEN, REINE RECHTsLuEHR 260.
11. "Judgments of justice cannot be tested objectively. Therefore, a science

of law has no room for them." KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 49
(1945); KELSEN, REINE REcHrsLHRE 197.
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maker, in performing his political task no doubt regards as a good
one, but no objective value judgment can be rendered in regard to
this purpose or in regard to the law as the social technique to accomplish this purpose. Rather, law, like the norms of any normative
order, is either valid or not regardless whether we like its contents.
Thus the validity of a legal norm depends on its source; it is not
Austin's "sovereign" to whom we must look, however, but rather
to the legal norm. If, for instance, a city police chief promulgates a
new traffic rule, this rule is valid only if the legal order, such as a
regulation of the state highway commissioner, authorizes it; and the
commissioner's regulation must likewise be grounded in law, e.g., a
statute authorizing him to issue regulations. The lawmaking power
of the legislature derives from the state's constitution, which in turn
may be based on an older constitution. The original state constitution
was again authorized by higher law, in our case the federal constitution, which authorizes the states to make law in those fields not
reserved to the federal government. This might be a fair outline of
the American picture, but it is at once obvious that this system of
legal hierarchy is confined neither to this country nor to any particular country or form of government. It is simply a description of
the norm-creating process, whether it takes place in America, England, Nazi Germany, or ancient Rome. To say, therefore, that "under
our system even government must operate within the law," 12 as one
often hears, is too narrow. Not only our government but any government can act only within the law. Even Hitler's "will" was law unto
the Germans only because the then German constitution provided
that he had the supreme lawgiving power. 13 What the quoted statement means is that, under a system such as ours, the government
may act only within the confines of pre-established, ascertainable law.
That is the constitutional situation in what the Germans call a
Rechtsstaat, which unfortunately is not the state of affairs in a great
many countries. Yet nobody can truly doubt that the legal systems
of those and many other autocracies, old and new, constitute "law,"
too.
Having determined, then, that any law must be based on the constitution-written or unwritten, tyrannical or democratic-the question irresistibly arises: On what authority is the constitution based? Of
course, many a constitution was enacted pursuant to the authority
of a previous constitution; and so may our Constitution be based on
the Articles of Confederation. 14 But who or what authorized the
12. Justice Douglas in Yanish v. Barber, 73 Sup. Ct. 1105, 1108 (1953).

13. See the discussion of this kind of law in In the Matter of the Estate

of Leefers, 127 Cal. App. 2d 550, 274 P.2d 239 (1954).

14. Article thirteen of the Articles of Confederation, however, authorized
changes of the Articles only upon unanimous assent of the states. The
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latter? Its force can be said to be grounded in a revolutionary act,
as manifested in the Declaration of Independence. Similarly, British
law can be traced a long way back; but the laws and decrees of
William the Conqueror were not authorized by those who prior to
him ruled England. We must concede that it was his act of subjection
of England that created what the Pure Theory calls the basic norm:
"A norm the validity of which cannot be derived from a superior
norm we call a 'basic' norm." 15 Its assumption stems from the empirical recognition that successful revolutions, conquests, or even
military occupations are norm-creating events. The men who partook
in the French or American revolutions were law-violating rebelsuntil they succeeded: ex iniuria ius oritur. Thus the basic norm
furnishes the reason for the validity of a positive legal order. The
presupposition of this norm, which is not a positive norm, is the
condition under which a coercive order, established by acts of man
and by and large effective, may be interpreted as a system of obj ectively valid norms. 16
It may be said, however, that successful conquests and revolutions
are norm creating events because international law so authorizes. International law may then be restated as providing as follows: "Whenever a group of men overthrows the government and disrupts its
legal continuity by establishing a new legal order which is by and
large obeyed, this new legal order is recognized and becomes the
law of the land.' 7 A new state or system of government has been
formed. It depends on one's political philosophy to choose the force
from which the legal system derives. If it is international law, however-and this is Kelsen's political choice 18 -then the search for the
basic norm has been merely deferred, for if the law of nations is a
legal order, it, too, must have a basic norm. International law must
be grounded in customary law whose basic norm might be formulated as follows: "The states ought to behave as they have customarily
behaved."'19 Nothing can demonstrate more forcefully the weak
character of international law than its basic norm. As a matter of
fact, one may seriously doubt whether the above-quoted restatement,
Constitution was declared to be in force after ratification by only nine
states. It might be concluded, therefore, that the Constitution became law,
like its predecessor, by revolutionary act rather than by authority of existing law.
15. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 111 (1945).
16. KELSEN, REINE REc rsr.LEm 196-209, 364; Kelsen, What Is the Pure
Theory of Law?, 34 TuL.L. REV. 269, 276 (1960); Kelsen, On the Basic Norm,

47 CALIF. L. REV. 107 (1959).

17. See KELSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE 212-221; KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF
LAW AND STATE 118-122 (1945).
18. KELSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE 343-345.
19. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE
RECHTSLEHRE 222.

369 (1945); KELSEN,

REINE
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and therefore international law as such, has any normative character.
The basic norm of religion is the basic command, subject to further
search for a reason of its validity, that we ought to obey the commands of God.20 It would be going too far, however, to say that
indeed a system of natural law could be deduced from the basic norm
hypothesis with the same logical force as a positivist, natural-law
denying system.21 As Kelsen emphasizes, there exists merely an
external similarity between the theory of the basic norm and the
natural law doctrine, in that both purport to derive the validity of
the legal order from an assumption of a norm which is outside of the
positive law. The natural law doctrine, however, inquires about the
contents of the legal system and it attempts to answer the question
whether a positive legal system is valid categorically, that is, depending on whether or not it is in accordance with the natural principles of justice. In other words, positive law is valid under that
doctrine because it has a certain content-because it is just. The
Pure Theory of Law, on the other hand, inquires merely as to the
formal validity of a legal system regardless of its contents; and it
answers this question not categorically but merely hypothetically,
viz.: "If the positive law is to be regarded as valid, one must presuppose a ('basic') norm under which men ought to behave in such
a fashion as the historically first constitution (under which the posi22
tive legal system has been created) prescribes it."
From an observation of the legal hierarchy an answer can be given
to the age-old question whether judges "make" or "apply" the law: a
judge, like any other law applier, such as a legislator under the
constitution or an administrative agency under a statute, both applies
and makes law. He applies the higher norm, for instance a statute
declaring, negligent homicide to be a tort or criminal offense, by
making a command-and hence a new concrete norm-that the defendant shall pay the plaintiff a certain sum of money, or by directing the sheriff to confine the accused in a jail. The law which the
judge thus applies by making new law on a lower level may be the
constitution or a simple statute.
In the Anglo-American legal system, the applicable higher norm
may also be "precedential" law, that is, it may be based on the
opinions of judges in previous similar cases. The existence of this
judge-made law constitutes no exception to our rule that judges make
law by applying law. A judge who lays down a new rule of law, does
so because-and only insofar as-the legal system of his jurisdiction
20. Kelsen, On the Basic Norm, 47

CALIF.

L. Rav. 107, 108 (1959).

21. Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6 J.LEGAL ED. 457,
461 (1954).
22. KELSEN, REI

RECHTSLEHRE 442-443.
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so authorized him. A judge who must decide a lawsuit based on a
cause of action not grounded in existing statutory or precedential
law-let us say, on a claim of absolute liability for the handling of
explosives in a state where there has never been a decision on this
point-may dismiss the action for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, because the legal order contains no norm in
the plaintiff's favor. In so doing, he may briefly rule that the "doctrine of absolute liability has never been adopted in this state." On
the other hand, he may exercise his authority to create a new rule of
law and decide in the plaintiff's favor. In this case, too, the judge
applies law-the rule of law that authorizes judges, to create a new
rule of law if the existing law is found to be unsatisfactory or unreasonable according to the judge's opinion.
It is at once clear that the individual who thus applies law will
very often have a choice between various interpretations of the law
he has to apply, because the lawmaker-either deliberately or unintentionally-has left the discretion to choose between various answers to the law applier; as when the former directs the latter to
assess a penitentiary sentence between five and ten years for a given
crime, where he leaves it to an administrative agency to take "appropriate measures" to carry out the statute, where a constitution
authorizes lawmaking to regulate "commerce," or where a statute
prescribes "cruelty" as a divorce ground. In all these cases the law
may be applied correctly in a variety of ways. It depends on the
policy choice of the law applier whether he wants to give the higher
law a broad or narrow meaning.2
The Pure Theory, as all too briefly sketched in this article, has
been criticized on a variety of grounds, most of which concern themselves with this or that phase of our theory. It is not necessary to
discuss them here. Two attacks, however, appear to go to the heart
of positivism and deserve a moment's attention. The first propounds
that the Pure Theory of Law is too much what it says: an abstract,
purely logical theory "devoid of real life." But this argument is no
more valid than it would be against mathematics, which deals with
abstract numbers and bodies instead of concrete things, such as
apples or bombs. Moreover, it is not accurate to say that the "analytical lawyer is a positivist. He is not concerned with ideals; he takes
the law as a given matter created by the State, whose authority he
does not question."24 His system of legal theory is, indeed, not concerned with ideals. Although he does not question the authority of
23. Thus 1 DAvis,

ADMN'ISTRATV.

LAw

23 (1958),

correctly holds that

policy determination and adjudication cannot be kept apart. But see Jaffe,
Book Review, 73 HARV.L. REV. 1638; 1639 (1960).
24. See F=rEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 163 (3d ed. 1953).
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the state, he may, however, question the desirability and wisdom
of its laws, which he, the positivist, like any other human being, may
seek to alter by legal means or even by revolution. Hans Kelsen
himself has been a most outstanding example of a jurist concerned
with ideals of peace and justice. Nor of course would any reasonable
positivist deny that a lawyer's education, in law school or elsewhere,
should concern itself with "ideals," in other words, with politics and
ethics. While the positive legal theorist points out that the basic
norm hypostasizes the assumption that the law should be obeyed,
the jurisprudence teacher may well turn into social psychologist and
discuss the problem why the law is actually obeyed; and to this he
may add the even more vexatious question why supreme court
judges, and other law applying organs whose duty to enforce the
law is not subject to legal sanction (wherefore it cannot be regarded
as a legal duty),25 actually as a rule do enforce the law. Whatever
answer, if any, the positivist may have to these and similar problems, he should not present political or ethical postulates in the
guise of law.
The second contention is similar but it goes more directly to the
moral side of positivism. In divorcing law from ethics, religion and
morality, the argument runs, the Pure Theory is actually fostering
amorality by treating on an equal level the legal system of, say, the
United States or Switzerland with that of dictator Franco or the
Soviet Union.26 But it is true that Spanish fascist law is law, as was
that of Hitler. It is up to man to change the law with a forthright
attitude by recognizing it as law that can be altered-not by lulling
oneself into believing that it is non-law!
Furthermore, the positivist is essentially a relativist and therefore
humble. He does not have the knowledge, which the protagonist of
natural law ideas professes to have, that this or that system of law
27
Rather, he
and government is inherently better than any other.
tolerantly believes that there does not exist, or is at any rate not
within human cognition, a system of law that conforms to the absolute
good. And as long as men will be different from one another, in
preference over the "happy antheap" (as Dostoyevski sarcastically
termed the totalitarian society of the possible future),28 there will
25. KELSFX, REINE REc TSLEmm 272-273.
26. KELSEN, RE m RECHTSLER.E IV-V. And
NATuRAL

L. F. 154, 156-158 (1960).

27. KELSEN, RmES

see Ebenstein, Book Review, 5

REcHTsLEHRE 357-444, analyses virtually ever Western

theory of justness as well as many current maxims of justice, such as "to
each his own," the golden rule, and the categorical imperative.
28. Of course, if we reach the goal of the Brave New World, not much law
would be necessary at all. Men Will simply be caused-by chemical injections, drugs, hypnopedia, etc.-to do their tasks rather than told what they
ought to do.
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be no law in any given state that pleases everybody. The second-best
solution must therefore suffice: law that pleases the majority. That
29
is the political postulate of democracy.
29.

KELSEN, WHAT

IS JUSTiCE 22-24 (1957).

